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We present two robust quantum key distribution protocols against two kinds of collective noise,
following some ideas in quantum dense coding. Three-qubit entangled states are used as quantum
information carriers, two of which forming the logical qubit which is invariant with a special type
of collective noise. The information is encoded on logical qubits with four unitary operations,
which can be read out faithfully with Bell-state analysis on two physical qubits and a single-photon
measurement on the other physical qubit, not three-photon joint measurements. Two bits of
information are exchanged faithfully and securely by transmitting two physical qubits through a
noisy channel. When the losses in the noisy channel is low, these protocols can be used to transmit
a secret message directly in principle.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum dense coding and quantum teleportation are
two typical examples in quantum information exploit-
ing striking nonclassical properties of entangled states
to perform otherwise impossible tasks. Quantum dense
coding, which was first proposed in 1992 [1], enables
the communication of two bits of classical information
with the transmission of a qubit. This feature makes
it have a good application in secure quantum communi-
cation [2, 3]. Quantum dense coding was demonstrated
by using photon pairs entangled in polarization in 1996
[4] and subsequently was investigated experimentally by
using some other quantum systems, such as continuous
variables [5], nuclear magnetic resonance [6] and atomic
qubits [7]. The theoretical researches have been broad-
ened to high-dimension quantum states [2], more than
two entangled qubits [8] and hyperentangled quantum
states [9].
In quantum dense coding, the Bell-state analysis
(BSA) is one of the key important steps. Although
the four Bell states are orthogonal to each other and is
deemed to be discriminated deterministically in principle,
BSA is always a technical difficulty, which yielding low
efficiencies and low discrimination fidelities. Using only
the polarization degree of freedom of photons, three Bell
states can at best be discriminated with linear optics,
which reduces the attainable channel capacity of quan-
tum dense coding from 2 bits to log23 ≈ 1.585 bits [4].
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Recently, cross-Kerr nonlinearity was used to implement
two-qubit controlled-NOT gate [10], whose character can
also be used to solve the BSA problem. Furthermore,
hyperentanglement (i.e., entanglement in more than one
degree of freedom (DOF)) enables a full BSA in polariza-
tion DOF with linear optics [9, 11]. In particular, Schuck
et al. [12] proposed a complete deterministic linear-optics
BSA by employing the intrinsic time-energy correlation
of photon pairs generated with high temporal definition
in 2006. If we can control the time of arrival of these
two photons at beam splitter (BS), i.e, make them arrive
at the BS simultaneously, these four Bell states can be
discriminated faithfully in principle and the experiment
gives its success probability between 81%-89%.
Although there are many kinds of physical systems
which can be selected by quantum communication, pho-
ton is the most popular one, relying on its good feature
in preparation and manipulation. However, during the
transmission, the polarization DOF of photons is inci-
dent to be influenced by the thermal fluctuation, vibra-
tion and the imperfection of the fiber, which we call them
noise in total. At present, we always suppose the noise
in a quantum channel is a collective one [13]. That is,
the fluctuation of noise is slow in time. If several pho-
tons transmit through the noisy channel simultaneously
or they are close to each other, the alternation arising
from the noise on each qubit is identical. With this kind
of noise, several methods have been proposed to cancel or
reduce the noise effect, such as entanglement purification
[14], quantum error correct code (QECC) [15], single-
photon error rejection [16] and decoherence-free subspace
(DFS) [17, 18]. QECC encodes one logical bit into sev-
eral physical qubits according to the kind of noise, and
the user measures the stabilizer codes to detect the errors
and then correct them. Compared with QECC, single-
2photon error rejection schemes require less quantum re-
source, although they succeed probabilistically. Entan-
glement purification is a method to distill a maximally
entangled states from some less-entanglement states by
sacrificing several samples affected by the noise. The
influence of noise can only be reduced in entanglement
purification and infinite steps are needed to get a per-
fect maximally entangled state. DFS can be composed
of several qubits which suffer from the same noise and
compensate the effect of noise, and then it posses the in-
variability against the noise. This feature can be used
to encode messages in quantum communication over a
noisy channel. Boileau et al. [18] proposed a quantum
key distribution (QKD) scheme with a collective random
unitary noise by using linear combinations of two singlet
states |ψ−〉.
In this paper, we present two fault-tolerant quantum
key distribution schemes against two different kinds of
collective noise, the collective-dephasing noise and the
collective-rotation one, following some ideas in quantum
dense coding. Three-qubit entangled states are utilized
as quantum information carriers. Each logical qubit
transmitted is composed of two physical qubits and is in-
variant during the transmission. The message is encoded
on each logical qubit transmitted with one of four unitary
operations and can be read out with a Bell-state analy-
sis and a single-photon measurement on each three-qubit
quantum system, not a three-qubit joint measurement
(i.e., a Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state mea-
surement). Two bits of information are exchanged faith-
fully and securely by transmitting two physical qubits
through a noisy channel. When the losses in the noisy
channel is low, our quantum cryptography schemes can,
in principle, be used to transmit a secret message directly.
II. FAULT TOLERANT QUANTUM KEY
DISTRIBUTION BASED ON QUANTUM DENSE
CODING WITH COLLECTIVE NOISE
A. review of quantum cryptography based on
quantum dense coding in an ideal condition
We review the basic principle of quantum cryptogra-
phy based on quantum dense coding in an ideal condition
first [2, 3]. Suppose the receiver Alice wants to share a
set of key with the sender Bob. She prepares a sequence
of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs in which each is
randomly in one of four Bell states
|φ±〉AB = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉)AB, (1)
|ψ±〉AB = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉)AB, (2)
where the subscripts A and B represent two entangled
photons. |0〉 and |1〉 are the two eigenvectors of σz . Alice
picks up photon B in each pair to form the sequence SB
and sends it to Bob who performs one of four unitary
operations on each photon in the sequence SB randomly.
These four operations are
U00 = UI = I = |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|,
U01 = Uz = σz = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|,
U10 = Ux = σx = |1〉〈0|+ |0〉〈1|,
U11 = Uy = −iσy = |1〉〈0| − |0〉〈1|. (3)
The subscripts 00, 01, 10 and 11 are the two bits of infor-
mation represented by the corresponding operations. σx,
σy, σz are Pauli operators. These four unitary operations
will change the four Bell states from one to another. For
example, operators U00, U01, U10 and U11 can transform
the state |φ+〉 into |φ+〉, |φ−〉, |ψ+〉, and |ψ−〉, respec-
tively. After the operations, Bob transmits the sequence
SB back to Alice who knows the original states and per-
forms two-photon Bell-state measurements on the photon
pairs. In this way, Alice can get the information of op-
erations Bob performed and she can share a sequence of
secret key with Bob. As two bits of key can be shared by
means of only one photon being transmitted, this quan-
tum information process is named as quantum dense cod-
ing.
When there is noise in the transmission of photons, we
can use a similar entangled state to implement quantum
dense coding, which can be written in a general form
|Φ±〉AB = 1√
2
(|0〉A|0L〉B ± |1〉A|1L〉B),
|Ψ±〉AB = 1√
2
(|0〉A|1L〉B ± |1〉A|0L〉B). (4)
Here the subscript L denotes the logical qubit, which
can be made of several physical qubits experiencing the
same noise and then compensating the noise effect due
to the peculiar relationship between them. The logical
qubits are invariant with the noise and are constructed
according to the form of noise.
It is well known that quantum dense coding can be
used to improve the capacity of secure quantum commu-
nication [2, 3]. The security of quantum communication
is its most important character, compared with classi-
cal communication. If quantum dense coding cannot be
used for secure quantum communication, it will loss the
significance as a classical signal is far easier to be pre-
pared and robust against the channel noise. For instance,
in a classical way, Alice and Bob can communicate eas-
ily with the two states |0〉 and |1〉 against a collective-
dephasing noise shown in Eq.(5). Also they can commu-
nicate by using the two states | + y〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + i|1〉)
and | − y〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − i|1〉) to avoid the effect of the
collective-rotation noise shown in Eq.(11). However, a
secure quantum communication resorts to at least two
nonorthogonal states [19–27]. That is, it requires that
the superposition of two eigenvectors is also free to the
collective noise. The two classical states {|0〉, |1〉} are
immune to a collective-dephasing noise, but their super-
position is not. So do the two states {|+ y〉, | − y〉} to a
3collective-rotation noise. We will introduce two methods
to construct a logical qubit against two kinds of collective
noise, which will retain the security of quantum cryptog-
raphy simultaneously. We discuss them in detail below.
B. Quantum cryptography based on quantum
dense coding against a collective-dephasing noise
A collective-dephasing noise can be described as
Udp|0〉 = |0〉, Udp|1〉 = eiφ|1〉, (5)
where φ is the noise parameter and it fluctuates with
time. In general, a logical qubit encoded into two physi-
cal qubits with antiparallel parity is immune to this kind
of noise as these two logical qubits acquire the same phase
factor eiφ
|0L〉 = |01〉, |1L〉 = |10〉. (6)
In this way, the four entangled logical states used for
quantum cryptography based on quantum dense coding
against a collective-dephasing noise can be made up of
four three-qubit entangled states as
|Φ±dp〉AB1B2 =
1√
2
(|0〉A|01〉B1B2 ± |1〉A|10〉B1B2),
|Ψ±dp〉AB1B2 =
1√
2
(|0〉A|10〉B1B2 ± |1〉A|01〉B1B2). (7)
The logical qubit B is composed of two physical qubits
B1 and B2.
Our quantum cryptography scheme based on quantum
dense coding against a collective-dephasing noise works
as follows.
(1) Similar to Refs. [2, 24], Alice prepares a se-
quence of quantum systems in the entangled state
|Φ+〉AB = 1√
2
(|0〉|0L〉+ |1〉|1L〉)AB = 1√
2
(|0〉A|01〉B1B2 +
|1〉A|10〉B1B2). Alice divides the quantum systems into
two photon sequences, SA and SB. SA is composed of
all the logical qubits A in the quantum systems and SB
is made up of the logical qubits B, which is composed of
two physical qubits B1 and B2.
(2) Alice sends the logical qubit sequence SB to Bob
and keeps the sequence SA.
(3) After receiving the sequence SB, Bob chooses ran-
domly a subset of logical qubits as the samples for er-
ror rate analysis and the other logical qubits make up
of the message sequence SBM for generating the private
key. Bob measures each logical qubit in the samples by
choosing randomly one of the two bases σBz ≡ σB1z ⊗σB2z
and σBx ≡ σB1x ⊗ σB2x . Also he tells Alice which logical
qubits are chosen as samples. Under these two bases, the
original entangled state can be written as
|Φ+dp〉AB1B2 =
1√
2
(|0〉A|01〉B1B2 + |1〉A|10〉B1B2)
=
1
2
[|+〉A(|++〉 − | − −〉)B1B2
+|−〉A(| −+〉 − |+−〉)B1B2 ]. (8)
That is, the outcomes obtained by Alice and Bob are
correlated if they choose the same bases for their logical
qubits. However, the vicious action done by Eve will
destroy this correlation and be detected, same as those in
Refs.[22, 28]. Alice and Bob can exploit the correlation
to check the security of the transmission of the logical
qubits run from Alice to Bob.
(4) For the message sequence SBM , Bob operates each
logical qubit with one of the four unitary operations,
{Ω00,Ω01,Ω10,Ω11} which is made up of two unitary op-
erations on two physical qubits, i.e.,
Ω00 = ΩI = I1 ⊗ I2,
Ω01 = Ωz = Uz1 ⊗ I2,
Ω10 = Ωx = Ux1 ⊗ Ux2,
Ω11 = Ωy = Uy1 ⊗ Ux2. (9)
The subscripts of Ω denotes the code {00, 01, 10, 11}, and
the subscripts 1 and 2 represent the unitary operations
performing on the photons B1 and B2, respectively. The
relation between the initial state, final state and the op-
erator is shown in Table I. These four operations will not
drive the states prepared by Alice out of the subspace
S = {|Φ±dp〉AB1B2 , |Ψ±dp〉AB1B2}. In other words, the
states operated by Bob are also antinoise when they are
transmitted back to Alice through a collective-dephasing
noise channel. After the unitary operation, Bob sends
the sequence SBM back to Alice.
TABLE I: The relation between the initial state |ψ〉i, the final
state |ψ〉f and the unitary operation.
|Φ+dp〉f |Φ
−
dp〉f |Ψ
+
dp〉f |Ψ
−
dp〉f
|Φ+dp〉i Ω00 Ω01 Ω10 Ω11
|Φ−dp〉i Ω01 Ω00 Ω11 Ω10
|Ψ+dp〉i Ω10 Ω11 Ω00 Ω01
|Ψ−dp〉i Ω11 Ω10 Ω01 Ω00
(5) Alice picks up each entangled quantum system from
the two photon sequences SAM and SBM . Here SAM
is made up of the remaining logical qubits in SA after
the first sampling for analyzing error rate of the first
transmission from Alice to Bob. Alice performs a Bell-
state measurement on the two photons AB1 and a single-
photon measurement on the photon B2 with X = σx
basis for distinguishing the four GHZ states |Φ±dp〉AB1B2
and |Ψ±dp〉AB1B2 . These four states to be discriminated
can be written as
|Φ±dp〉AB1B2 =
1√
2
(|φ±〉AB1 ⊗ |+〉B2 − |φ∓〉AB1 ⊗ |−〉B2),
|Ψ±dp〉AB1B2 =
1√
2
(|ψ±〉AB1 ⊗ |+〉B2 + |ψ∓〉AB1 ⊗ |−〉B2).
(10)
4Here |±〉 = (1/√2)(|0〉±|1〉) are two eigenvectors of Pauli
operator σx. From this expression, one can see that with
these two measurement outcomes Alice can distinguish
these four three-photon GHZ states deterministically and
read out the operations done by Bob on the logical qubits
B in principle.
(6) For checking the security of the second transmission
from Bob to Alice, Alice chooses randomly a subset of
the outcomes of the measurements on three-qubit states
operated by Bob as the samples for error rate analysis,
similar to Ref.[2]. She requires Bob tell her his operations
on these samples and then analyzes the security of the
second transmission by herself. If the error rate is very
low, she tells Bob that their quantum communication
is secure in principle; otherwise, they will discard their
outcomes and repeat their quantum communication from
the beginning.
(7) If their quantum communication is secure, Alice
and Bob exploit error correction and privacy amplifica-
tion techniques to distil a private key, same as Ref. [23].
As the logical qubits are always in the maximal
mixture of |0L〉 and |1L〉 during the transmission, the
intercept-resending attack strategy by Eve will not work.
The secret message are encoded on logical qubits with
four unitary operations, which may be eavesdropped by
inserting spy photons [29], in particular by inserting delay
photons as the invisible photons with a different wave-
length compared to the legitimate photons can be fil-
trated out by a special filter [29] before Bob performs
his operations. In order to guarantee the security, Bob
has to select parts of samples to check the multiphoton
(n > 2) rate as the attack with spy photons will increase
the number of photons in each quantum signal. In detail,
Bob can choose another subset of logical qubits B and an-
alyzes its multiphoton rate with photon number splitters
(PNSs). That is, for each logical qubit B, Bob uses two
PNSs to split each physical qubit (B1 and B2) and then
measures the number of the photons in each legitimate
physical qubit. If the multiphoton rate is unreasonably
high, Bob terminates the transmission and they repeats
the communication from the beginning, same as Ref.[29].
Certainly, the technique of photon number splitters is
not mature in the application of quantum communica-
tion. At present, Bob can use beam splitters instead of
PNSs to complete the task of analyzing the multiphoton
rate, same as Ref.[29].
Without Trojan horse attack with spy photons, the
transmission of the sequence SB from Alice to Bob is
completely same as that in Bennett-Brassard-Mermin
1992 (BBM92) quantum key distribution (QKD) proto-
col [22] which has been proven secure [30, 31]. Thus,
there is no problem in the security of the transmission of
the sequence SB from Alice to Bob in principle. On the
other hand, the reduced matrix of each logical qubit B
from Bob to Alice is ρB =
1
2
(
1 0
0 1
)
, which means that
Eve cannot get useful information if she only eavesdrops
the transmission from Bob to Alice in principle. That is
to say, our quantum cryptography based on fault toler-
ant quantum dense coding against a collective-dephasing
noise is secure in principle.
C. Quantum cryptography based on quantum
dense coding against a collective-dephasing noise
Another kind of noise model called a collective-rotation
noise operates as
Ur|0〉 = cosθ|0〉+ sinθ|1〉,
Ur|1〉 = −sinθ|0〉+ cosθ|1〉. (11)
The parameter θ depends on the noise and fluctuates
with time. With such a type of collective noise, |φ+〉 and
|ψ−〉 are invariant. Logical qubits can be chosen as
|0L〉 = |φ+〉, |1L〉 = |ψ−〉. (12)
Then the states for quantum cryptography based on
quantum dense coding can be chosen as
|Φ±r 〉AB1B2 =
1√
2
(|0〉A|φ+〉B1B2 ± |1〉A|ψ−〉B1B2),
|Ψ±r 〉AB1B2 =
1√
2
(|0〉A|ψ−〉B1B2 ± |1〉A|φ+〉B1B2). (13)
Also, Alice divides the quantum systems into two pho-
ton sequences, SA and SB. She sends the logical qubit
sequence SB to Bob and keeps the sequence SA. After re-
ceiving the sequence SB, Bob chooses randomly a subset
of logical qubits as the samples for error rate analysis and
the other logical qubits make up of the message sequence
SBM for generating the private key. Bob measures each
logical qubit in the samples by choosing randomly one of
the two bases σBz ≡ σB1z ⊗σB2z and σBy ≡ σB1y ⊗σB2y . Also
he tells Alice which logical qubits are chosen as samples.
Under these two bases, the original entangled state can
be written as
|Φ+r 〉AB =
1
2
(|0〉A(|00〉+ |11〉)B1B2
+|1〉A(|01〉 − |10〉)B1B2)
=
1√
2
(|+ y〉A|+ y〉B1 | − y〉B2
+| − y〉A| − y〉B1 |+ y〉B2). (14)
That is, the outcomes obtained by Alice and Bob are
correlated if they choose the same bases for their logical
qubits. For the message sequence SBM , Bob operates
each logical qubit with one of the four unitary operations
{Θ00,Θ01,Θ10,Θ11} which can be written as
Θ00 = ΘI = I1 ⊗ I2,
Θ01 = Θz = Uz1 ⊗ Uz2,
Θ10 = Θx = Uz1 ⊗ Ux2,
Θ11 = Θy = I1 ⊗ Uy2. (15)
5With these four operations, Bob can manipulate the
total state of the quantum system AB1B2 and then sent
back the two photons B1B2 to Alice. The relation be-
tween the initial state, final state and the operation is
shown in Table II. After the operation, Bob sends the
sequence SBM back to Alice.
TABLE II: The relation between the initial state |ψ〉i, the
final state |ψ〉f and the unitary operation.
|Φ+r 〉f |Φ
−
r 〉f |Ψ
+
r 〉f |Ψ
−
r 〉f
|Φ+r 〉i Θ00 Θ01 Θ10 Θ11
|Φ−r 〉i Θ01 Θ00 Θ11 Θ10
|Ψ+r 〉i Θ10 Θ11 Θ00 Θ01
|Ψ−r 〉i Θ11 Θ10 Θ01 Θ00
As these four entangled states in Eq. (13) are orthog-
onal, they can be discriminated faithfully in principle.
With the measurement results and the initial states, Al-
ice can deduce the unitary operations performed by Bob.
Different from the case with a collective-dephasing noise,
Alice first performs a Hadamard operation on B1 and
then takes a Bell-state measurement on A and B1 and a
single-photon measurement on the photon B2. The effect
of the Hadamard operation can be written as
|0〉 → 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉),
|1〉 → 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). (16)
Under the Hadamard operation, the four states in
Eq.(13) are transformed into
|Φ±r 〉AB1B2 →
1√
2
(|φ±〉AB1 ⊗ |+〉B2 − |ψ∓〉AB1 ⊗ |−〉B2),
|Ψ±r 〉AB1B2 →
1√
2
(|ψ±〉AB1 ⊗ |+〉B2 − |φ∓〉AB1 ⊗ |−〉B2).
(17)
The combinations of a Bell-state measurement and an X
basis single-photon measurement are different for these
four states. In this way, Alice can read out the infor-
mation about the operations done by Bob and they can
share two bits of information by means of transmitting
two physical qubits in a collective-rotation noise.
As for the security of this quantum cryptography pro-
tocol, it can be made as the same as the case with a
collective-dephasing noise.
III. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
In quantum communication with a noisy channel, the
two parties need introduce some other physical qubits
[18, 27] to prevent a logical qubit from noise or decrease
the success probability of faithful transmission of qubits
[16, 17]. When quantum dense coding is used for quan-
tum cryptography in a noisy channel, three-photon quan-
tum systems are the optimal ones as the quantum dense
coding based on the measurements on wavepackets is not
easy to be implemented at present. If these two quan-
tum dense coding schemes are not used for secure quan-
tum communication, they are not optimal as the effect
of the two kinds of collective noise can be avoid with
two orthogonal single-photon states and each qubit can
carry one bit of information. However, only two orthog-
onal single-photon states cannot ensure the security of
quantum cryptography.
If the losses in the noisy channel is low, our quantum
cryptography schemes can be used for transmitting secret
message directly, same as quantum secure direct commu-
nication schemes [2, 28, 32–35]. In this time, Alice and
Bob should first ensure the security of the first trans-
mission, i.e., that for the sequence SB , and then Bob
encodes his secret message on the sequence SBM with
the four unitary operations, same as Ref. [2].
In summary, we have presented two fault-tolerant
quantum key distribution protocols against two different
kinds of collective noise, following some ideas in quan-
tum dense coding. Each logical qubit, which is invari-
ant when it is transmitted in a collective-noise channel,
is made up of two physical qubits. The information is
encoded on logical qubits with four unitary operations,
which will not destroy the antinoise feather of the quan-
tum systems. Alice can read out Bob’s message with a
Bell-state analysis and a single-photon measurement on
each three-qubit quantum system, not three-qubit joint
measurements (i.e., GHZ-state measurments). Two bits
of information are exchanged faithfully and securely by
transmitting two physical qubits through a noisy channel.
When the losses in the noisy channel is low, our quan-
tum cryptography schemes can, in principle, be used to
transmit a secret message directly.
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